A comparative study of sibling policy of the divided nations by Liou, To-hai
A Comparative Study of Sibling Policy of the Divided Nation / 107 
兩韓關係與兩岸關係的比較研究： 
台灣的大陸政策 vs.南韓的北韓政策 
 
劉德海 
國立政治大學外交學系教授兼系主任 
 
關鍵字：兩岸關係、南北韓關係、陳水扁、盧武鉉 
 
中文摘要 
儘管進入冷戰後時代以來，發生戰爭的機率在世界各
地都明顯地大幅減少，但是經濟繁榮的東北亞卻未能完全
擺脫戰爭的陰影，危機仍此起彼落。我們若比較冷戰後時
代的台海兩岸關係與朝鮮半島的兩韓關係，不難發現鐘擺
現象不僅存在於這兩組雙邊關係間，而且也存在於兩岸互
動與兩韓互動之間。1990 年代初期當兩韓關係因發生第一
次北韓核武危機而陷入緊張情勢之時，兩岸關係卻出現首
度對話。而 1990 年代後期至本世紀初，當兩韓關係因自由
派金大中與盧武鉉兩任總統執政而走向和解，並舉行有史
以來的兩度高峰會之時，兩岸關係卻因台灣島內台獨意識
抬頭而陷入低潮，甚至有 1995-1996 年的台海危機。 
 
2008 年馬英九就任總統後兩岸關係政經關係始大幅改
善，而另一方面，兩韓關係在 2008 年 2 月李明博總統上台
後由於他對北韓採取高姿態的強硬路線，北韓進行了一連
串的挑釁(2009 年的第二次核子試爆、2010 年 3 月涉嫌擊
沈天安艦、11 月砲擊延坪島) 而一再出現危機。 
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本文主旨在就兩韓關係與兩岸關係做一比較研究，尤
其聚焦於台灣的大陸政策 vs.南韓的北韓政策。首先檢視過
去六十多年兩岸關係與兩韓關係的發展，並點出每個時期
的特徵與重大變化。然後再討論台灣在民進黨陳水扁總統
時代的大陸政策 vs.南韓在盧武鉉總統時代的北韓政策。試
圖探索兩韓與兩岸兩種互動模式的比較，俾利找出促進與
阻礙兩種互動模式的主要動力與阻力。而這些動力與阻力
對未來兩韓與兩岸關係的影響，其中包括兩岸互動是否會
再出現鐘擺現象由 2008 年時的正面導向擺向負面導向抑或
是維持目前的經濟整合或由經濟整合走向政治整合。 
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Abstract 
 
Both Taiwan and South Korea are countries 
embracing a presidential system and their major foreign 
and security policy making is in the National Security 
Council led by the President.  Against this background, 
exploring the political elite’s perceptions of the 
international environment at an idiosyncratic level is 
especially conducive to our understanding of their foreign 
policy behaviors. In this article, horizontal comparative 
analysis is employed to explore Chen Shui-bian China 
policy and Roh Moo-hyun North Korea policy. As both 
Taiwan and South Korea are divided nations, their foreign 
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policies behaviour is characterized by security orientation 
and its relationship with the ‘other half’ and overall foreign 
policy are inseparable. In fact, foreign policies makers of 
divided nations are constantly puzzled by which policy 
should be regarded as the first priority.  Hence, this article 
will center on the security factor in Taiwan’s Mainland 
China policy under President Chen Shui-bian and South 
Korea’s North Korea policy under President Roh Moo-
hyun by examining their ruling elite’s perceptions of their 
siblings, policy goals and preferred approaches as well as 
evaluation of their policy implementation in a comparative 
way with an aim to clarifying linkage between their policies 
toward siblings.   
 
There were four major divided nations after the end 
of the World War II. However, with the unification of 
Vietnam in 1975 and reunification of Germany in 1990, 
China and Korea are now the remaining divided nations in 
the world.  With the advent of the post-Cold War era, the 
battlefield of ideological confrontation has shifted from 
international arena between Democracy and Communism 
to domestic stage between conservative and progressive 
forces. This phenomenon can be easily identified in the 
domestic politics of Taiwan and South Korea.  Their 
ideological line can be drawn from how they deal with their 
siblings.  In the Korean case, the first liberalist government 
in South Korean politics since 1948 emerged in 1998 
when President Kim Dae-jung took office that year. His 
government inaugurated a policy of engaging North Korea 
under the Sunshine Policy. It was followed by Moo-hyun 
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Roh’s Peace and Prosperity Policy.2  After ten years in 
power, liberalists were replaced by the conservative Lee 
Myung-bak Government from 2008 to 2013.  President 
Lee’s North Korea policy put denuclearization ahead of 
engagement.  As a result, inter-Korea relations have 
dramatically changed from peaceful reconciliation to 
heightened tension culminating in 2010’s sinking of the 
South Korean Navy patrol ship Cheonan that was 
allegedly attacked by North Korean torpedoes.3  
 
Alternatively, Taiwan’s relations with China under 
pro-independence President Chen Shui-bian of the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) were on the verge of 
war in 2005 when Beijing promulgated the Anti-secession 
Law which was designed to provide China with a legal 
rationale to use force against Taiwan independence. 4  
Nevertheless, with the emergence of the Ma Ying-jeou 
Government of Kuomintang (KMT), cross-strait relations 
have reversed to constructive engagement marked by the 
opening of direct transportation across the Taiwan Straits 
and the signing of an economic cooperation framework 
agreement (ECFA) in June 2010. 
                                                 
2  Choong Nam Kim, “The Roh Moo Hyun Government's Policy toward 
North Korea,” International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2005, 
Vol. IX, No.2, pp. 1-33, 
http://www.icks.org/publication/pdf_2005_f/1_Nam_Kim.pdf 
3  “Editorial: Wrangling over Cheonan,” The Korea Herald, June 17, 2010, 
http://www.koreaherald.com/opinion/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=2010061700
0577 
4  Pasha L. Hsieh, “The Taiwan Question and the One-China Policy: Legal 
Challenges,” 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=pas
ha_hsieh 
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Against this background, this article intends to centre 
on the exploration of Shui-bian Chen’s China policy and 
Moo-hyun Roh’s North Korea policy in a comparative 
fashion,5 with a focus on the security factor.  Both Taiwan 
and South Korea are divided nations, 6  whose foreign 
policy behaviour is characterized by a security 
orientation,7 and inseparability of their relationship with the 
other half (Taiwan’s Mainland China Policy and South 
Korea’s North Korea policy) and overall foreign policy. 8 In 
fact, foreign policy makers of divided nations are 
constantly puzzled by which policy should be regarded as 
the first priority, overall foreign policy or their policy toward 
the other sibling. 9   Given that the definition of security 
dictates their perceptions of the other half, this article will 
center on the security factor in Taiwan’s Mainland China 
policy under President Shui-bian Chen and South Korea’s 
North Korea policy under President Moo-hyun Roh by 
examining their ruling elite’s perceptions of their siblings, 
policy goals and preferred approaches as well as 
evaluation of their policy implementation in a comparative 
way with an aim to identifying linkages between their 
                                                 
5  Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, 
Krieger Publishing Company (March 1982). 
6  To-hai Liou, South Korea's Foreign Relations Since the mid 1980s 
(Chinese), Taipei: Young Wang Publishers,1997, p. 4. 
7  Edward A. Olsen, Korea: the Divided Nation, Praeger Security 
International, 2005. 
8  Yung-Hwan Jo and Stephen Walker, “Divided Nations and Reunification 
Strategies,” Journal of Peace Research, 1972, Vol. 9, No. 3, 247-259.  
9  The definition of divided nations here means that as long as one side 
claims the other is a part of its jurisdiction, then they are divided nations. 
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policies toward siblings and eventually drawing lessons 
from the two cases.   
 
Ruling elite’s perceptions of their siblings 
 
Taiwan 
 
         Current Taiwan politics can be largely divided into 
two camps, the pan-green coalition and the pan-blue 
group.  One of the major dividing lines is how to deal with 
emerging China.  In view of the emerging importance of 
economic interest in the post-Cold War period and the 
increasing dependence of Taiwan’s economic prosperity 
on China,10 the pan-blue group consisting of the KMT, the 
People First Party and the New Party, is convinced that 
Mainland affairs and foreign policy cannot be dealt with 
separately, hence relations with China should be put as 
the nation’s first priority.   
 
In contrast to the pan-blue group, the pan-green 
group, including the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, 
stresses Taiwan identity and favours Taiwan’s 
independence.11  Consequently, the pan-green group is 
reluctant to use the Republic of China (ROC) but rather 
claim ‘Taiwan’, while referring to the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) as China in order to show Taiwan is an 
independent country from China.  They view the PRC as a 
                                                 
10  Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the U.S. 
Care?” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2002, Vol. 25, No. 3: 18. 
11  Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity,” Asian 
Survey, August 2004, Vol. 44, No. 4: 477. 
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threat as Beijing claims that Taiwan is a renegade 
province of China and it refuses to rule out the possibility 
of using force against Taiwan’s announcement of 
independence. 12   For instance, former Mainland Affairs 
Council Chairman Joseph Wu indicated that “China 
continues to prepare for an invasion of Taiwan and now 
has more than 900 missiles targeted on the island and 
located in five bases in nearby Fujian Province plus eleven 
military satellites in orbit.” 13   
 
Furthermore, President Chen Shui-bian also pointed 
out that “Despite China's impressive economic rise, it has 
become more authoritarian, posing a grave threat to our 
sovereignty…".14  The passage of China’s Anti-Secession 
Law codifying non-peaceful measures against Taiwan in 
March 2005, was interpreted by the DPP Government as a 
deliberate action to unilaterally change the status quo. 
Moreover, an analysis by the Integrated Assessment 
Office of Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense also 
suggested that “if Taiwan is unable to smoothly implement 
its three major military procurement projects, China will 
enjoy a nearly three-to-one advantage in total combat 
capabilities over Taiwan at some point between 2020 and 
2035. This will give China a military edge in an attack 
                                                 
12  Phillip C. Saunders, “Long-term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: 
Implications for U.S. Taiwan Policy,” Asian Survey, December 2005, Vol. 
45, No. 6: 974. 
13  “Taiwan: China targeting island with 900 missiles on 5 bases,” November 
16, 2006  
 http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/06/front2454056.070138889.
html 
14  Ibid. 
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against Taiwan and an upper hand that will further induce 
China to resolve the Taiwan issue through military 
action.”15 
 
In addition, an editorial of the ROC Ministry of 
Defense in October 2006 indicated that North Korea’s 
nuclear test revealed the fact that “China has not made 
serious efforts in assisting in solving the Northeast Asia 
problem in the past ten years.”  Lee Wen-Chung, former 
DPP Legislator and member of the National Defense 
Committee, the Legislative Yuan, was quoted as saying 
that by Beijing rejecting strict sanctions against North 
Korea, proposed by the U.S. and Japan it was attempting 
to extract concessions from Washington and Tokyo on 
another diplomatic front.  He also said that when U.S. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Chinese Foreign 
Minister Li Zhaoxing held a joint press conference after 
their talks over the implementation of the United Nation’s 
1718 Resolution, Rice hoped that China would follow the 
resolution to examine if there was any dangerous illegal 
materials in its trade with North Korea.  Not responding to 
the call directly, Minister Li instead said that Beijing 
wanted the U.S. to honor its commitments to the ‘One 
China Policy’, the three joint communiqués and opposition 
to Taiwan independence.  Ostensibly, China was using the 
North Korean nuclear crisis to attack another target 
(Taiwan).  The editorial concluded by stating that “What 
we can learn from this crisis is that differences in resolving 
the North Korean issue among the related parties can be 
employed by China to maneuver against us [Taiwan).  We 
                                                 
15  http://www.tp.org.tw/document/detail.htm?id=20012155 
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should watch development of the North Korean crisis 
closely with extra carefulness.  In particular, when the 
crisis was getting serious last year (2005) and the 
arrangement of six-way talks was underway, China 
requested the U.S. to stop arms sales to Taiwan in 
exchange for its cooperation with Washington in the North 
Korea issue.  Fortunately, the U.S. did not respond 
accordingly.”16   
 
South Korea 
 
Because of the military threat from North Korea, 
national security has always been the most important 
variable that affects South Korea’s politics and diplomacy 
since the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established in 
1948.  However, a changing ruling elite, with different 
values, can make a diametrical difference in foreign and 
defense policies orientation due to different perceptions of 
the same enemy.  Until 1998, South Korea was ruled by 
right-wing conservatives who did not trust the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and regarded it as an 
arch rival.  Hence, their foreign and defense policies were 
anti-DPRK-oriented and the United States was a natural 
military and diplomatic ally of those conservative 
administrations.   
 
Nevertheless, with South Korea’s democratization 
since 1987, reinstating direct presidential election in 
particular, liberalist ideology quickly emerged as an 
                                                 
16  Editorial: It is Obvious that Communist China is Using the North Korean 
Issue to Conduct Diplomatic Blackmail,” October 24, 2006, 
http://www.mnd.gov.tw/modnews/mininews/matter.aspx?PublicID=5045 
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alternative to the conservatives. Public opinion and civic 
organizations have also risen as an important variable that 
can affect governmental policy making.  National security 
and foreign policy are no longer reserved for government 
alone as they were during the Cold War-era.17  The 1997 
South Korea’s financial crisis paved the way for the 
liberalists (or leftists) to come to power.  Conglomerates 
which were deliberately nurtured by former military-turned 
President Park Chung Hee since the 1960s were now 
seen by South Koreans as culprits of the national disgrace, 
a sudden downgrade from a developed country to a Third 
World state.  Conservative regimes based on an alliance 
of military, government and conglomerates were blamed 
for the crisis.  Against this background, liberal Kim Dae-
jung was elected as President in December 1997 and 
terminated the 50-years of conservative rule that featured 
much anti-communist stances. 
 
With the emergence of liberalists who favor 
engaging North Korea, South Korea’s DPRK-US oriented 
security concept thus underwent fundamental changes.  
The remarkable example was the 2000 inter-Korea 
summit under the Sunshine policy of Kim Dae-jung.  South 
Korean’s perceptions of North Korea and the U.S. had 
dramatically changed. In the past, North Korea had been 
seen as an enemy, but was now viewed as a sibling in the 
early 2000s.  Almost at the same time, South Korean’s 
perceptions of the U.S. on the other hand turned negative.  
Anti-American sentiment increased.  As a result, a 
                                                 
17  Choong-Nam Kim, “The Management of the ROK-U.S. Relations in the 
Post-Cold War Era,” Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 
Spring/Summer 2003, pp. 55. 
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perception gap between South Korean liberalist 
governments and the U.S. Administrations over North 
Korea transformed into a major policy difference between 
the two countries. Partly because of its accommodating 
approach to North Korea, partly because Seoul was within 
the DPRK’s range of heavy artillery,18 the Kim Dae-jung 
Government attempted everything possible to avoid 
military conflicts with North Korea and stressed dialogue, 
interactions and reconciliation.  By contrast, viewing North 
Korea from a superpower status with neo-Conservative 
fashion after 911 in 2001, the Bush Administration favored 
an approach forcing Pyongyang to come to the negotiation 
table and frequently threatened to resort to military options 
against the DPRK.19 
 
With President Roh Moo-hyun coming to power in 
February 2003, South Korean politics completed a power 
transformation from the old generation of three Kims (Kim 
Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil) to the so-
called “386 Generation”. Those people were in their 
thirties in the 1990s, and got involved in the 
democratization campaign in the 1980s and were born in 
the 1960s.  The leading elite in the Roh government was 
composed primarily of the “386 Generation”.  Growing up 
in the period of anti-American and anti-military rule,20 they 
                                                 
18  North Korea deploys around 12,000 sets of artillery in the vicinity of the 
DMZ, most of them are targeting Seoul, The Liberty Times,  June29, 
2003, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/ 
19  Gregory F. Treverton, Eric Larson and Spencer H. Kim, “Bridging the 
‘Open Water’ in the U.S.-South Korea Military Alliance,” The Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 2, Fall 2003, p.154. 
20  http://www.mainichi-
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viewed themselves as progressive forces.  A poll done 
with members of the ruling Uri Party, which maintained a 
majority in the Parliament, in April 2004 showed that 63% 
of surveyed members believed that China would be the 
ROK’s most important partner in the future, while only 26% 
considered the U.S. the most important future partner of 
the country.21   
 
With regards to their image of North Korea, partly 
because they did not experience the Korean War, partly 
because North Korea’s economy was stagnating, the elite 
in the Roh government viewed North Korea as a sibling 
and did not consider Pyongyang as a threat.22  President 
Roh never suggested that North Korea was either an 
implacable adversary or a nation on the edge of total 
collapse. Rather he saw reunification as a goal that can 
only be achieved through progress toward a unified Asian 
community.  As a result, they were convinced that North 
Korea would not use nuclear weapons against the ROK.   
 
Despite mounting pressure on North Korea to 
relinquish its suspected nuclear weapons program from 
Washington,23 President Roh pledged in June 2003 that 
his government would step up efforts to promote 
cooperation and exchanges inheriting the spirit of the June 
                                                                                                         
msn.co.jp/kokusai/asia/news/20040417k0000m030176000c.html 
21  http://www.chosun.co.kr/w21data/html/news/200404/200404280242.html 
22  Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, “Adjusting to the New 
Asia,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003, p.121. 
23  South Korea, the U.S. and Japan agreed at the Trilateral Cooperation and 
Oversight Group (TCOG) on June 12-13 to crack down on the suspected 
illegal activities of the North including drug trafficking and money 
counterfeiting. The Korea Herald, June 17, 2003. 
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15 inter-Korea Summit in 2000. In addition, taking a 
lenient position on North Korea’s nuclear programs, 
President Roh made a speech in Los Angles on 
November 13, 2004 that a hard line policy over North 
Korea's nuclear weapons would have "grave 
repercussions," adding, "There is no alternative left in 
dealing with this issue except dialogue." He also 
mentioned that North Korea’s assertion of developing 
nuclear weapons was not groundless but for self-defense.  
This message was obviously targeted at Kim Jong Il whom 
President Roh intended to build trust with by expressing 
his understanding of North Korea’s security concern. 24  
Later in the same month, when interviewed by the 
Brazilian newspaper Estado de Sao Paulo, President Roh 
stressed that “the DPRK would abandon its nuclear 
development programs if it were provided with sufficient 
compensation.”25 In the wake of North Korea’s detonation 
of its first nuclear bomb in October 2006, President Roh 
warned that it should not be exaggerated, admitting that 
the detonation did increase the security threat. Kim Tae-
woo, Director of the Arms Control Section, Korea Institute 
for Defense Analyses, supported President Roh’s 
argument.  He said that “from a security perspective, the 
situation is grave, but if exaggerated, it could bring about a 
negative impact on the economy.”26 
                                                 
24  Taehyun Kim, “Bush Relected, Roh Speaks Up, and Kim Redirected? 
Prospect of the Second Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Part I,” 
Sejong Policy Research, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2005, p. 238, 
http://www.sejong.org/Pub_st/PUB_ST_DATA/kst002-13.pdf 
25  http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/2004/nov/ndr17nov04.html#item1 
26  “Roh Moo-hyun’s Remarks: No Exaggeration on Nuclear Threat were 
Criticized,” Chosun Ilbao, November 3, 2006, 
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Security Policy Goals and Preferred Approaches  
 
Taiwan 
 
For the Chen Shui-bian Government, anti-China 
sentiments and an anti-unification positions were primary 
sources of the DPP’s claim to legitimacy as the first 
indigenous regime and the integral element for the pan-
green camp to justify its rationale for Taiwan’s 
independence based on Taiwan identity.27  In fact, Chen 
Shui-bian won the presidential election in 2000 mainly 
because of his successful manipulation of this approach. 
During his eight-year presidency, he did not change his 
approach of maintaining power through political means.  
His approach featured mustering domestic support 
through incessant campaigns to demonize China and to 
de-sinificate under the name of Taiwan consciousness.  
This operation became more evident a year before the 
2008 presidential election. In March 2007, President Chen 
accelerated his drive to edge the island towards formal 
independence from China by saying Taiwan must seek 
independence in a pro-independence group, the 
Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). 28  In the 
previous month, he had adopted the policy of de-
                                                                                                         
http://chn.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2006/11/03/20061103000014.ht
ml 
27  Yu-Shan Wu, “Taiwan in 2001: Stalemated on All Fronts,” Asian Survey, 
February 2002, Vol. 42, No. 1: 42-43. 
28  “China fury after call for independence,” The Australian, March 6, 2007,  
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21333905-
2703,00.html 
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sinification aimed at severing ties between the Chinese 
mainland and Taiwan.  His government deliberately 
replaced the word China with Taiwan on postage stamps 
on February 28, which was the 60th anniversary of a 
Taiwanese uprising against Generalissimo Chiang Kai 
Sheik Nationalists.  The DPP government also 
encouraged state enterprises to drop the name China in 
their titles.  As a consequence, the Chinese Petroleum 
Corporation became CPC Corporation, Taiwan, while 
China Shipbuilding Corp was changed to CSBC 
Corporation, Taiwan.29 
 
To counterweigh China’s military threat, the Chen 
Shui-bian Government attempted to upgrade its military 
capabilities by overseas arms procurements and to 
reinforce indigenous research and development.  Taiwan 
developed its own Hsiung Feng 2E, Brave Wind cruise 
missiles capable of reaching Shanghai and Hong Kong.30 
The Pan-green coalition also made every possible effort to 
purchase advanced weapons from the U.S. and other 
countries as well.31  Until the end of its second term, the 
                                                 
29  “China fury after call for independence,” The Australian, March 6, 2007,  
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21333905-
2703,00.html 
30  “Military balance tilting toward China,” Yomiuri Shimbun, January 25, 
2008, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20080125TDY05305.htm 
31  Minister of National Defense under DPP rule was involved setting up a 
company named Taiwan Goal.  The company was allegedly engaged in 
secret talks with France on the procurement of eight minehunter vessels, 
multi-role fighter jets and other weaponry. “Ministry of defense to 
complete probe of firm Taiwan Goal,” Taipei Times, March 28, 2008, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/03/28/20034073
77 
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Chen Shui-bian Government made a number of attempts 
to push through an arms purchase deal of billions of US 
dollars in the Legislative Yuan (equivalent to Congress) 
but failed mainly because the Pan-blue held the majority in 
the legislative body. 32  The Government planned to buy 
US$12 billion worth of weapons, including 30 Boeing AH-
64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters, 60 Sikorsky UH-
60 Black Hawk helicopters, eight diesel electric 
submarines, four Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 air defense 
missile batteries and 66 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 
50/52 fighters.33   Nevertheless, Taiwan did increase its 
defense spending by 16.4 percent in 2008, seeking to 
strengthen the island's military in response to a rising 
threat from China. The defense budget of US$10.3 billion 
accounted for 20.1 percent of total government spending 
in 2008.34  
 
Furthermore, the DPP government also spared no 
effort in seeking security and diplomatic collaboration with 
the U.S. and Japan to check and balance rising China. To 
counter China’s military threat, the government tended to 
seek security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan. It also 
supported the proposed democratic alliance of the U.S., 
Japan, Australia and India in the name of anti-authoritarian 
                                                 
32  Initially, the total sum was US$19 billion in 2001. Steve Chan, “Taiwan 
in 2005: Strategic Interaction in Two-Level Games,” Asian Survey, 
February 2006, Vol. 46, No. 1: 66. 
33  The Bush administration decided to offer Taiwan submarines, PAC-3s 
and P-3 Orions in 2001.  “U.S. Freezes $12B in Arms Sales to Taiwan,  
June 9, 2008, 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3569882&c=ASI&s=TOP 
34  “Taiwan plans big increase in defense spending,” August 23, 2007,  
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/23/asia/taiwan.php 
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Communism in addition to upgrading self-defence.  A 
remarkable example was the North Korean nuclear 
detonations in October 2006. The ruling DPP elite at the 
time tried to take advantage of the North Korean case to 
sell their vision to the world.  In his initial response to 
North Korea’s nuclear test on 9 October, President Chen 
Shui-bian, in greeting a group of Japanese, said, as a long 
term partner with the same democratic values and a 
security ally of Japan, Taiwan would join Japan and the 
democratic community to impose further sanctions against 
North Korea without fail.  He also expressed his hope that 
Taiwan would like to stand side-by-side with Japan and 
the democratic camp in the future and stressed that 
“Japan and the U.S. are Taiwan’s best security partners.  
Even without formal diplomatic relations, Taiwan is willing 
to contribute to military interchange and cooperation and 
eventually some sort of quasi-military alliance of the three 
countries will be realized,” he added.35   
 
On the second day (October 10th), while 
condemning North Korea’s nuclear test for posing a 
severe threat to regional peace, President Chen urged the 
international community to pay equal attention to the 
potential military confrontation across the Taiwan Straits 
and to promote multilateral dialogue similar to the six-way 
talks.  He stated that the international community should 
seriously review deficiency and defects of the East Asia 
collective security mechanism.  Taiwan should be 
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included in the East Asian collective security system or 
mechanism, so that cross-Taiwan straits relations and 
peace and stability in Asia-Pacific as a whole can be 
maintained.36  Later, on October 30, President Chen in a 
video conference with Japanese academics and reporters 
suggested this could be done in preparation for the 
establishment of a trilateral security mechanism involving 
Taiwan, Japan and the United States, given the high 
tension on the Korean Peninsula resulting from North 
Korea's missile tests and nuclear detonations.37   
 
In the same vein, David Ta-wei Lee, who was 
Taiwan's Representative to the U.S. at the time, in 
December 2006 reminded the world that “North Korea is 
not the only security problem in East Asia, China’s 
continuously rapid military build-up is another equally 
important security problem which not only poses a threat 
to Taiwan’s survival and development but also to security 
and stability in Northeast Asia.”  He cited examples of a 
Chinese submarine secretly following a U.S. aircraft 
carrier, another submarine’s intrusion into Japan’s 
territorial sea and China’s refusal to announce no intrusion 
into Taiwan by force.38 Professor Chen Wen-hsien, of the 
Graduate Institute of Taiwan History atat National 
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Chengchi University, suggested that Taiwan should take 
advantage of the global focus on peace in East Asia in the 
wake of the North Korean nuclear test and urged Beijing 
authorities not to blame North Korea for nuclear 
detonation on the one hand, while increasing its own 
military deployment against Taiwan on the other hand.  
This might strengthen North Korea’s resolve and increase 
its bargaining chips.39 
 
With China’s growing military threat in mind, the DPP 
elite viewed the 2006 North Korean nuclear test as a good 
opportunity to discredit China and to open up a window for 
Taiwan’s involvement in the regional security mechanism 
and looked forward to positive implications for Taiwan 
security. They believed that the test severely damaged 
China’s international prestige and provided Japan a 
chance to accelerate its military buildup.  They also used 
the event to urge the international community to pay 
attention to the tension of cross-Straits relations with an 
aim to being included in the multilateral security 
mechanism in the future and in any regional strategic 
alliance against emerging China.  They were also pleased 
to see a Japan with increasing military capabilities and 
even did not oppose a nuclear armed Japan, given that a 
strong Japan was conducive to Taiwan’s bid for 
independence.  
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Parris Chang, former Deputy Secretary-general of 
Taiwan’s National Security Council, indicated that North 
Korea’s nuclear test made China and the U.S. the biggest 
losers.  The test completely destroyed the Six-Party talks, 
the China-dominated strategic platform, and China’s 
credibility as a reliable mediator. Alternatively, U.S. 
President Bush’s approach of no war and no peace in the 
past six years turned out to be a disaster and his reliance 
on China to persuade Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear 
weapons via the Six-Party talks proved to be a wrong 
policy.  North Korea’s denotations of nuclear bombs would 
consolidate Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s stance 
to accelerate Japan’s military build-up and make Japan a 
normal state. 40   The Deputy Secretary-general also 
believed that North Korea openly defied Beijing's advice 
not to resort to this provocative act and embarrassed 
China by going ahead with the missile tests in July 2006.  
He said that the nuclear test in October 2006 alarmed 
Japan and provided it with the convenient justification for 
bolstering military capability such as missile defense, spy-
satellite launches and the strengthening US-Japan 
security alliance.    
 
In the same vein, Chih-Cheng Lo, Chairman of 
Political Science Department at Soochow University and 
former Chairperson of the Research and Planning 
Committee, the ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, opined 
that North Korea’s nuclear detonation, an overt opposition 
to China’s request, was targeted at Beijing.  Japanese 
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Prime Minister Abe at the time who was in his trip to 
Beijing was the beneficiary of North Korea’s diplomatic 
coup against China.  He was able to relieve Japan’s 
dispute with China over several Yasukuni Shrine’s visits.  
What is more, the nuclear detonation gave Japanese 
conservatives ammunition to justify their desire to possess 
nuclear weapons in the future. 41   With North Korea’s 
mounting threat to its security, Japan revised its law 
upgrading the Defense Agency to the ministerial level.  
The modification of its defense policy could lead to the 
relaxation of its weapons exports ban.  In an interview with 
a Canadian magazine in February 2007, Vice Defense 
Minister Ker Chen-heng mentioned that Taiwan would 
welcome, and even look forward to seeing Japan adjust its 
national defense policy regarding the export of military 
techniques and weapons sales to Taiwan. He said that "It 
would be very helpful to Taiwan's national defense if 
Japan agreed to sell weapons to us."  Ker specified that 
"Taiwan especially hopes to acquire Japan's anti-
submarine techniques…." 42  
 
In sum, for pan-green camp, North Korea’s nuclear 
detonation provided Taiwan a better chance to be 
incorporated into the US-Japan alliance against China at 
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least informally and to increase its ammunition to check 
and balance rising China and eventually to provide a 
better environment for seeking independence. China’s 
decreasing credibility seems to perfectly fit in the pan-
green camp’s anti-China rationale. 
South Korea 
When President Roh Moo-hyun took his office in 
February 2003, he changed North Korea policy’s name 
from “Sunshine Policy” to “Policy for Peace and 
Prosperity” but retained the nature of reconciliation. For 
improving relations with North Korea, the Roh Government 
tried to play down inter-Korea sensitive issues such as 
North Korean human rights issues, 43 reducing domestic 
spying activities targeting the DPRK, and removing “Anti-
Communist Bureau” from governmental agencies. 44 
Against this background, South Korea and North Korea 
terminated their fifty-year propaganda warfare on the 
border since June 2004.45 South Korea’s Defense White 
Paper also ceased to mention North Korea as its primary 
enemy since October 2004, despite strong criticism from 
the opposition Grand National Party. 46  The Roh 
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Government also revised the National Security Law 
deleting North Korea from the list of anti-government 
organizations.47   
However, South Korea under Roh did not relax its 
military muscle at all in response to perceive the military 
threat from North Korea but it sought independent defense 
from the US.  Roh made significant remarks regarding his 
philosophy on national security and direction for defense 
development during his speech marking the national 
liberation day in 2004.  Additionally, his statement in Los 
Angeles in September 2004 drew attention with regard to 
Korea’s strenuous pursuit of the ROK- US alliance based 
on self-sufficient defense and further civilian control of 
military affairs. 48 In 2007, the defense budget increased 
10% from the previous year to US$26.4 billion, then up to 
US$28.9 billion in 2008.  Strengthening of strategic forces 
and research and development projects increasing military 
expenses were aimed at building up South Korea's self-
defense capabilities, reducing its dependence on the US 
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military, 49  and responding to the military build-up of 
neighbours Japan and China,50 the former in particular. 
       President Roh Moo-hyun perseveringly strived for a 
diplomatic solution to North Korea's nuclear programs 
against criticism from both domestic conservatives and the 
U.S. He followed Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy, 
assuming that economic sanctions would not lead North 
Korea to halting the development of nuclear weapons. 
Moreover, he attempted to build a permanent mechanism 
of peace and stability in the Korean peninsula through 
economic assistance to North Korea, inter-Korea 
economic cooperation and a summit as well as multilateral 
approaches such as the Six-party talks.  In July 2006 
when North Korea fired several missiles ignoring 
international warnings, Japan in conjunction with the U.S. 
proposed to impose strict sanctions against North Korea’s 
provocative actions in the Security Council of the United 
Nations. 51  Japan even claimed that it had the right to 
initiate preemptive strikes against North Korea.  Insisting 
on dialogue with Pyongyang, 52 the Roh Government allied 
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with China to oppose any strict sanctions and military 
options so as to avoid pushing Pyongyang into a corner.53  
The two countries also objected to the holding of five-party 
talks to discuss how to cope with North Korea’s 
provocation, excluding the DPRK. 54  Even though North 
Korea detonated its first nuclear bomb in October 2006, 
still the Roh Government favored the accommodating 
approach to Pyongyang.  In its action plan to impose 
sanctions against the DPRK requested by the resolution of 
the UN Security Council, the Roh Government did not 
include concrete details, in particular the Kaeseong 
industrial park and the Mount Geumgang resort project 
were untouched. The reason was that no proof could be 
shown that money from the South was used to develop 
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). At the same time, Roh Government decided not to 
participate in the US-proposed Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) aimed at preventing the proliferation of 
WMD so as not to irritate Pyongyang.55 North Korea had 
repeatedly warned it would regard the South’s 
participation in the PSI as a declaration of war. The Roh 
Government also worried about the possibility of armed 
conflict if any attempt were made to interdict a North 
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Korean vessel, and limited their participation in the PSI to 
observing offshore drills.56 
 
In comparison with the Kim Dae-jung Government, 
the Roh Mu-hyun Government was more active, bolder 
and more independent in terms of conducting foreign 
policy. This tendency was shown in Roh’s seeking 
independence from the U.S. by insisting on engaging 
North Korea in spite of deteriorating U.S.-North Korean 
relations, attempting to serve as a mediator between 
Washington and Pyongyang exemplified by bringing North 
Korea and the U.S. back to the fourth round of the six-
party talks in August 2005 and claiming to pursue a 
balancing role in Northeast Asia. President Roh in March 
2005 stated that South Korea does not want to see the 
U.S. forces stationed in South Korea sent to act as task 
forces in Northeast Asia and his country was seeking to 
act as a strategic mediator between regional powers such 
as Japan, China and Russia.57 U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State Christopher Hill viewing the balancer doctrine was 
“annoyed’’.58 Furthermore, South Korean Deputy Foreign 
Minister Lee Soo-hyuk in June 2003 pointed out that the 
U.S. and Japan seemed to agree on the need to manage 
the North Korean nuclear issue at the United Nations, but 
South Korea urged the two sides to wait and see as efforts 
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were underway to realize multilateral dialogue. 59 
Additionally, South Korean Unification Minister Chung 
Dong-young conveyed President Roh's "important 
proposal" to Kim Jong-il in June 2005, an offer of large-
scale economic assistance what was the so called South 
Korean version of the Marshall Plan in exchange for the 
scrapping of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.60 
Minister Chung then visited Washington immediately after 
his meeting with Kim Jong-Il and presented proposals to 
the U.S. in order to get North Korea back to the 
negotiation table.61 In the wake of the subsequent fourth 
round of six-party talks, even though the U.S. insisted that 
North Korea must dismantle its nuclear facilities including 
both nuclear weapons and light water reactors, ROK 
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young indicated that 
North Korea has the right to maintain its light water 
reactors which are used for peaceful purposes.62  
 
Unlike his predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun viewed North 
Korea policy as the nucleus of a grand strategy comprising 
an overall policy for unification, foreign relations, 
security,63 and even economic development and regional 
integration.  To be more specific, the lynchpin of Roh's 
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vision of Korea's future role in Northeast Asia was North 
Korea.  Integration and normalization with North Korea 
and resolution of the crisis caused by North Korea's 
development of nuclear weapons capability were the 
foundations for a more assertive and constructive role for 
Korea throughout Asia, and the easing of an explosive 
situation that divides Northeast Asia. As organized mainly 
by the 386 Generation whose ideas were more liberal than 
the previous government, the Roh Moo-hyun 
Government’s approach to foreign policy stressed more 
independence, such as playing a balancing role and in its 
approach to the DPRK, more active engagement. For the 
Roh Government, the Kaeseong industrial park was not 
only a symbol of inter-Korean economic cooperation but a 
strategic manufacturing base that increased international 
competitiveness of South Korean products, inter alia their 
price competitiveness from a combination of South 
Korea’s technology with North Korea’s cheap labor.  The 
cost of their products would be much lower than those 
products made in China.64   
 
Hence, the Roh Government encouraged small and 
medium enterprises to set up factories at the Kaeseong 
industrial park by offering incentives such as tax holidays 
and loans.  Moreover, when negotiating free trade 
agreements with any country, South Korea always 
attempts to include a clause regarding those products 
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made in the Kaeseong industrial park and even other 
industrial parks in North Korea by South Korean 
companies as South Korean products and thus eligible for 
enjoying zero-tariff or preferential tariff.  For example, 
South Korea was able to persuade the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) to agree to their bilateral FTA to 
regard products made in both the Kaeseong industrial park 
and the Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone as products 
made in the ROK on the condition that more than 60% of 
its components came from South Korea.65 If this rule is 
successfully included in other bilateral FTAs signed by 
South Korea and its counterparts, this will contribute to 
exporting those products overseas for they enjoy price 
competitiveness and further accelerate North-South Korea 
economic cooperation. The economic benefit that the two 
Koreas could gain from this operation was estimated at 
US$20 billion per annum.66  
 
Another major ingredient of President Roh’s 
blueprint for the inter-Korea relationship and Northeast 
Asian regional integration is reconnecting inter-Korea 
railroads agreed by the two Koreas in their first summit in 
June 2000. At the time, President Kim Dae-ung described 
the railway as an “Iron Silk Road” to link South Korea by 
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land to Europe and Central Asia.67 The Roh Government 
was trying to narrow the gap between the economies of 
the two countries and prepare for eventual reunification. 
South Korea's economy at the time was 35 times bigger 
than its northern counterpart and its citizens earned 17 
times more. As a result, President Roh wanted to establish 
an inter-Korea rail link with the rest of Asia and ultimately 
to Europe from Kyongwon Railway Line (linking Seoul and 
Wonsan, a North Korean port city in East coast) via 
Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway and the Trans-China 
routes through the Seoul-Sinuiju railway (Kyongui Railroad 
Line). President Roh's Moscow summit with Russian 
President Vladimir Putin in September, 2004 served this 
function.  They explored the possibility of Seoul-Moscow-
Pyongyang collaboration in energy and transportation 
projects that eventually could help defuse tension on the 
Korean Peninsula. Main projects under discussion 
included linking pipelines to carry natural gas and oil from 
Russia's Far East and Siberia via North Korea to South 
Korea and the connection of the Trans-Korean Railway 
with the Trans-Siberian Railway. The proposed natural gas 
pipelines would provide crucial energy resources to South 
Korea and could also benefit the impoverished North, if all 
parties could agree on passage through the isolationist 
communist state. Provision of energy has been one of 
North Korea's key demands for scrapping its nuclear 
weapons development.68  
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Furthermore, the railway project would enable South 
Korea to be directly linked to Europe through North Korea. 
The two Koreas exchanged test trains in May 2007 for the 
first time in 56 years. If realized, freight train services 
joining the South and Kaesong would have sharply cut 
costs for South Korean businesses and have helped 
reduce tensions between the two sides.69 President Moo-
hyun Roh had a summit with Kim Jong-il in October 2007. 
At the time, more than 400 trucks cross the demilitarized 
zone by road every day, carrying raw materials into 
Kaeseong and bringing back finished goods. Inter-Korean 
trade more than tripled to US$1.35 billion in 2006 from 
US$425 million in 2000. 70 
Evaluation of Policy Implementation 
Taiwan 
 
Brinkmanship of a minor power could end up with 
the worst scenario of confronting either disastrous military 
attack from a major power or a diplomatic coalition of 
major powers.  In the eight years of his presidency, 
President Chen’s approach to China not only irritated 
Beijing but also annoyed Washington.  There was a 
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growing evidence of Sino-US condominium against 
Taiwan’s independence in President Chen’s second term 
(2005-2008), given growing accusations of Taiwan’s 
independence from both Washington and Beijing.  The 
PRC refused to contact Chen’s government directly, while 
improving relations with opposition parties and non-
government sectors.   Meanwhile, China also changed its 
approach to the Taiwan issue from insisting that “the 
Taiwan issue is a domestic affair that other countries have 
no right to intervene” to quietly engaging in persuading 
Washington to work together to eliminate the most 
probable cause for Sino-U.S. military confrontation, 
Taiwan independence.  In other words, China attempted to 
form a Sino-US condominium through several international 
issues, the North Korean crisis in particular, with an aim to 
constrain Taiwan’s growing tendency of independence 
under Chen Shui-bian.   
 
Associate Professor Jing-dong Yuan at Monterey 
Institute of International Studies indicated that Taiwan is 
one of the most important factors in China’s calculus, 
especially when it comes to cooperating with the U.S.  
Beijing needs Washington's cooperation in reining in the 
independence elements in Taiwan.  For example, one of 
the most important factors influencing China's North Korea 
policy is how it will affect Sino-US relations. Beijing has 
sought to maintain a good, stable bilateral relationship with 
Washington that serves China's interests including US 
willingness to restrain Taiwan from seeking 
140／The  Journal of International Relations XXXVIIII, 2015 
independence.71  As Yoichi Funabashi also pointed out, 
when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited the U.S. in 
December 2003, he proposed a deal to his U.S. 
counterpart that China would try to rein in and bring North 
Korea to the negotiation table while the U.S. should be 
self-restrained in its treatment of Taiwan. 72  In addition, 
both Professor David Shambaugh of George Washington 
University (GWU) and Former US Ambassador to China 
James Lilley echoed this analysis.  While attending a 
conference on East Asian Security and Taiwan held by the 
Elliott School of International Affairs at George 
Washington University in December 2006, Shambaugh 
and Lilley asserted that Sino-US relations had reached a 
mature stage. Taiwan was no longer a core issue on the 
Sino-US Agenda.  “Since Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao 
met US President Bush in December 2003, both countries 
have dealt with the Taiwan issue in a proper way and have 
put the issue under control.” Shambaugh explained.73   
 
In fact, President Chen’s approach of anti-China and 
pro-independence served as a driving force to make the 
condominium possible, for his approach was perceived by 
the U.S. as provocative, for Taipei was engaging in 
changing the cross-Straits status quo unilaterally against 
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Washington’s favoured position of status quo.  
Consequently, the Bush Administration changed its 
attitude toward the Chen Government from positive to 
negative.  In July 2004, Cato Institute Vice President Ted 
Galen Carpenter asserted that the US should tell Taiwan 
that its future depended on the Taiwan people themselves, 
no matter if they wanted reunification with China or sought 
independence or the status quo Taiwanese should take all 
the risks for their own decision. Taking this kind of crystal 
clear policy toward Taiwan as the first priority, the US 
could avoid a war with China years ahead because big 
powers should not fight a war for something irrelevant of 
their vital interest. 74  When receiving Chinese President 
Hu Jintao in Washington in 2006, US President George W. 
Bush, in his speech, made a long list of demands on 
problem like trade, counterfeit goods, human rights, North 
Korea and Iran.75 This shows that the US needed China’s 
assistance in many international issues, North Korea and 
Iran’s nuclear crises in particular, Washington became 
more and more unsatisfied with the Chen Shui-bian 
Government’s tough measures against Beijing.  From the 
Bush Administration’s perspective, Taiwan was attempting 
to raise tension between China and the US.  The 
Administration was especially angered at President 
Chen’s initiative to hold a referendum on the United 
Nations bid under Taiwan’s name.   
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Hence, direct accusations of the Chen Government 
by U.S. high ranking official appeared in 2007.  US 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in December 2007 
openly condemned the move as an unnecessary 
provocative policy to raise tension across the Taiwan 
Straits.76  This was a sharp contrast with US President 
Bush’s emphasis on increasing support to Taiwan in 
March 2001.77 Robert Sutter, a visiting professor of Asian 
studies at Georgetown University, also accused President 
Chen of promoting provocative policies and failing to take 
advantage of the Bush administration's goodwill over the 
past six years in an academic conference at GWU in 
December 2006. 78 As Professor Michael Wesley pointed 
out that Taiwan and North Korea were regarded as the 
two most destabilizing actors in Northeast Asia as both of 
them were choosing brinkmanship.  As a result, big 
powers in this area had converging interest and growing 
interdependence.79 
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In addition, the Chen Shui-bian Government’s 
intensified anti-China approach was also against the 
cross-Strait business community in Taiwan.  President 
Chen Shui-bian had changed the official China investment 
policy from "active opening and effective management" in 
2001 to "active management and effective opening” in 
early 2006.  This policy imposed restriction on Taiwanese 
firms’ investment in Mainland China and urged Taiwan 
investors to invest more in Southeast Asia, India and 
Americas rather than China to avoid risk under the so-
called “Southbound policy”. The change was seen as the 
government's move to tighten control on China 
investments against businesses' calls for further 
liberalization.80  
 
Nevertheless, Taiwanese businessmen tend to view 
China not only as a huge market but as a main 
manufacturing base for their global strategy.  That was 
why more than 70 percent of Taiwan’s outbound 
investment went to China in 2006, 81 and China has 
emerged as Taiwan’s major trading partner as well as 
largest export market, despite the hostile political situation 
across the Taiwan Straits.  It is reported that Taiwanese 
investment in China already exceeds US$120 billion on an 
accumulative basis.  According to Taiwan’s Investment 
Commission, the ROC’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, the 
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total amount of Taiwan’s investment in China stood at 
US$64.8 billion by December 2007.  In 2007 alone it was 
US$9.9 billion. Total indirect trade between the two sides 
was only US$3.9 billion in 1989; the first year business 
contact was officially permitted. In 2004, total trade was at 
US$62 billion - a 16-fold increase in just a decade and a 
half and then up to US$102.3 billion in 2007, with a trade 
surplus of US$46.2 billion favorable to Taiwan. Currently, 
more than 40% of Taiwan’s exports head for China and 
Hong Kong.  
 
By the end of Chen’s era, Taiwan who led Asia's four 
little dragons eight years ago was ranking the last among 
the four in terms of economic growth and in a weaker 
position in all aspects than before. “To put it bluntly, 
Taiwan now needs mainland China more than vice 
versa.” 82  The previous two presidential elections have 
shown that the top issue for voters was the economy, 
which was widely seen as having lost its competitiveness 
during Chen's eight-year rule.  Thus, Taiwanese voters 
shifted their support from DPP to KMT in the Legislative 
Yuan election in January 2008 first, 83  then again in 
March’s presidential election in that same year.  
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South Korea 
 
While insisting on actively engaging North Korea, the 
Roh Government also attempted to accommodate the 
Bush Administration’s requests as much as possible such 
as sending troops to Afghanistan and Iraq.   By keeping a 
warm relationship, they hoped that it would eventually 
persuade Washington to soften its policy toward the DPRK.  
On the other hand, improving relations with Pyongyang 
gave President Roh a leverage to play a leading role in 
politics in the Korean peninsula and to increase South 
Korea’s autonomy in the US-ROK alliance.  He also 
planned to take advantage of North Korea’s cheap labor to 
increase South Korea’s international competitiveness with 
a view to reducing the ROK’s economic dependence on 
China, simultaneously preventing North Korea from 
integrating into China,84 and countering mounting pressure 
from Chaiwan enterprises ‘competition, 85  eventually 
making South Korea a hub of Northeast Asia’s economic 
integration and the axis of politics and security in 
Northeast Asia.   
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Generally speaking, President Roh’s active 
engagement of North Korea was well received in the ROK 
but not without opposition.86  A poll done immediately after 
North Korea’s nuclear detonation shows that 73% of 
people under the survey hoped that his engagement policy 
continued with only minor revision, while 15.2% favored 
the termination of the engagement policy.  More than three 
fifths of the people endorsed the continuation of inter-
Korea economic cooperation projects. 87  However, his 
North Korea policy confronted increasing criticism from the 
opposition particularly in the wake of North Korea’s 
nuclear detonation in October 2006, mainly because the 
Roh Government refused to take tough sanction measures 
against Pyongyang.88  
 
By early 2007, the Roh Moo-hyun government’s 
unfavourable situation turned out to be positive mainly 
because the Bush Administration’s North Korea policy 
became pragmatic and US-DPRK relations improved. The 
remarkable example was the February 13 document 
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reached in the six party talks in Beijing in that year.89 At 
the same time South Korea relations with US also turned 
increasingly positive as well. This was demonstrated by 
the signing of a bilateral FTA in July 2007. 90  What is 
more, President Roh was finally able to realise his dream 
to cross the 38th parallel and subsequently had a summit 
with Kim Jong Il with the Declaration of Inter-Korea 
Development, Peace and Stability in October 2007.  
Nevertheless, high inflation rates due to worsening 
international economic environment downgraded his 
government’s economic performance. 91  In addition, the 
failure of working out a single presidential candidate in the 
progressive parties resulted in the emergence of 
conservative forces led by Lee Myung-bak.  
 
Conclusion  
    
        Three conclusions can be drawn from the above 
analysis.  First, the ruling elite’s subjective perceptions do 
have a decisive impact on their foreign and defense 
policies making. Second, geopolitics matters in the case of 
divided nations.  As a result, a divided nation’s foreign and 
defense policies are inseparable to its siblings. The 
success of overall foreign policy therefore depends on 
whether they can maintain positive relations with their 
other halves. No matter what, South Korea’s North Korea 
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policy or Taiwan’s Mainland China policy should be put in 
front of its overall foreign policy.  This is particularly true in 
Taiwan’s case due to the disproportionate power gap 
across the Straits. This echoes what former ROC’s 
Foreign Minister Federick Chien once said. “Cross-Straits 
relations should have the priority over foreign policy.”92 
Third, in terms of effectiveness of policy implementation, 
we can also find from this analysis that in spite of the 
importance of perceptions of decision makers and their 
policy choices, the success of small and medium powers’ 
foreign and defense policies also relies on the other 
halves’ relative power vis-à-vis themselves, their 
responses as well as policies of the surrounding major 
powers.   
 
In Taiwan’s case, ignoring the power asymmetry 
across the Taiwan Straits and the mounting significance of 
economic interactions in international relations in the 21st 
century, the Chen Shui-bian Government insisted on 
conducting a Mainland China policy characterized by 
promoting anti-China, Taiwan identity and Taiwan 
independence under the domestic political consideration.  
This kind of policy orientation just fell into China’s hands, 
for Beijing engineered Sino-US condominium based on 
their common interest of anti-Taiwan independence. As a 
result, DPP lost its ruling power to the KMT, mainly 
because of Taiwan’s poor economic performance under its 
rule.  In other words, the axis of Taiwan’s politics shifted 
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from Taiwan consciousness to economic resurrection in 
President Chen’s second term.  At the same time, rising 
tension across the Taiwan Straits owing largely to its pro-
independence movements such as campaigns to enter 
into the United Nations under the name of Taiwan and so 
on helped Beijing and Washington work together to jointly 
blame the Chen Government for its pro-independence 
movements and make Taiwan a troublemaker in the eyes 
of its neighbours in Asia Pacific.93 
 
       Alternatively, the Roh Government’s North Korea 
policy featured with peace and prosperity not only brought 
about improved inter-Korea relations and increased 
economic interactions between the two Koreas but also 
helped fine-tune the North Korea policies of the US and 
the ROK from early 2007 through to the end of Roh’s term.  
The Bush Administration, in its second term, shifted its 
policy toward Pyongyang from toughness to practicality in 
early 2007 due to the growing concern about rising China.  
As a result, the agreement of nuclear disablement in 
exchange for energy aid was reached first between the US 
and North Korea and then formalized in the Six-party talks 
on February 13, 2007. The Roh Government served an 
important facilitating role in the talks.94  Nevertheless, both 
the Chen Shui-bian Government and the Roh Moo-hyun 
Government lost presidential elections respectively to their 
opposition parties primarily due to their poor economic 
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performance.  Another factor that brought about the victory 
of conservatives in South Korea was concerns about the 
deteriorating South Korea-US security alliance. 
 
       Interestingly enough, this horizontal comparative 
analysis finds that the orientation of Taiwan politics and 
South Korean politics in the same period changed from 
ideological lines to economic priority under the pressures 
of globalization.  What is even more interesting is that the 
following governments of both countries take completely 
reversed policies toward their siblings vis-à-vis their 
preceding governments.  The results of their policy shifts 
happen to attest to the second conclusion that the divided 
nations had better put their policy toward siblings before 
their overall foreign policies. Unlike the previous 
government’s hostile China policy, the Ma Ying-jeou 
Government regards Mainland China policy as the first 
priority ahead of overall foreign policy and has actively 
improved relations with China, economic interactions in 
particular.  On the other hand, the ROK President Lee 
Myung-bak placed foreign policy in front of North Korea 
policy.  In other words, North Korea policy was relegated 
from top priority in the Roh Government to an appendix to 
Lee’s overall foreign policy. As a consequence, cross-
Straits relations so far have turned from negative during 
the Chen Shui-bian era to positive under the KMT 
Government, while inter-Korea ties have reversed from 
vibrant political and economic cooperation during Roh 
Moo-hyun period to the persistent tensions since the 
inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in March 2008, 
exemplified by the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyeong 
shellings in 2010.  Of course, international politics is 
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always dynamic, future developments of the two countries’ 
policies toward the other halves remain to be seen.  The 
above conclusions are to be tested. 
 
      What is worth mentioning is that Taiwan’s economic 
integration with China proves the validity of functionalism 
emphasizing the private sector forces in the process of 
integration, 95  while the South Korean case is 
characterised by neo-functionalism stressing the important 
role of government in the integration process. 96  Both 
cases show that economic interactions can reduce political 
tension.  However, the Taiwan case implies that economic 
interactions driven by the business sector can have a 
determining effect on domestic politics as well as cross-
Strait political relationship. 97  Which forces, non-
governmental forces or governmental forces, are 
sustainable in the sense of integration remains to be seen.  
The shutdowns of the Mount Kumgang Tourist Project in 
2009 and the Kaesong complex in early 2013 (The 
complex resumed work after 5-month shutdown) 
demonstrate that integration through governmental forces 
alone could be fragile. 
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